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Note
PERRY v. NEW HAMPSHIRE: ABANDONING THE SUPREME
COURT’S FUNDAMENTAL CONCERN WITH EYEWITNESS
RELIABILITY
SHAUN GATES ∗
In Perry v. New Hampshire, 1 the Supreme Court of the United
States considered whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment 2 requires preliminary judicial screenings of the reliability
of suggestive eyewitness identifications, even when not arranged by
police. 3 The Court concluded that due process is not implicated
when the identification is not the result of suggestive, police-arranged
procedures. 4 The majority’s focus on the presence of suggestive police arrangement in its eyewitness identification jurisprudence led it
to incorrectly conclude that deterrence was the primary aim of the
due process constraint on eyewitness testimony. 5 The majority failed
to recognize that the due process framework arose out of the Court’s
reliability concerns and that the presence of police arrangement in its
eyewitness jurisprudence, which reflects a practical reality, was only
discussed as it affected reliability. 6 The Court should have revised the
current due process framework to better measure reliability and rec-
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1. 132 S. Ct. 716 (2012).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2.
3. Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 723.
4. Id. at 730.
5. See infra Part IV.A.
6. See infra Part IV.A.
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ognized that the due process constraint is implicated in all suggestive
circumstances. 7
I. THE CASE
At approximately 3:00 AM on August 15, 2008, Officer Nicole
Clay of the Nashua Police Department responded to a call alerting
police that a black man was attempting to gain access to multiple automobiles parked behind an apartment complex. 8 When Officer Clay
entered the parking lot in her marked police cruiser, she heard what
sounded like an aluminum bat hit the ground. 9 Officer Clay immediately noticed a black man, later identified as Barion Perry, standing
between two automobiles. 10 After Officer Clay exited her police
cruiser, Perry began to walk toward her holding two audio amplifiers
in his hands. 11 As Perry walked towards Officer Clay, he stated that he
had found the amplifiers lying on the ground and was “just moving
them.” 12
Alex Clavijo, one of the residents of the apartment complex, approached Officer Clay only moments later. 13 Clavijo stated that he
owned one of the automobiles that had been broken into and further
indicated that his neighbor, Nubia Blandon, had witnessed an individual break into his car. 14 Officer Clay asked Perry to remain with
another officer who had arrived on scene so that she could speak with
Clavijo’s neighbor. 15 Officer Clay and Clavijo met Blandon in the
hallway outside of her fourth-floor apartment. 16 When asked to describe what she had seen, Blandon stated that she watched a tall black
man with a baseball bat in his hand circle Clavijo’s car, open the

7. See infra Part IV.B.
8. State v. Perry, No. 08-S-1797-1798, at 1 (N.H. Super. Ct. Apr. 28, 2009) (order
denying defendant’s motions to suppress).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 2. Perry also asserted that he saw two “kids” leaving the parking lot. Id. He
walked with Officer Clay to a nearby street and identified an individual as one of the
“kids.” Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.; Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 721 (2012).
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trunk of the car, and remove a large box from within. 17 When Officer
Clay asked her for a more specific description of the man, Blandon
pointed to her window and stated that the individual standing with
the police officer in the parking lot was the individual she had seen. 18
Perry was arrested following this conversation. 19 Approximately one
month after Perry’s arrest, the police presented Blandon with an array
of photographs containing a picture of Perry, but she was unable to
identify him. 20
Prior to trial in the New Hampshire Superior Court, Perry moved
to suppress Blandon’s out-of-court identification, averring that the introduction of such testimony would violate his rights to due process
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 21 According to Perry,
Blandon’s identification of him was both unreliable and unnecessarily
suggestive. 22 Additionally, Perry argued that Blandon’s identification
was inevitable because he was the only black man in the vicinity and
was standing next to a police officer at the time. 23
Over Perry’s objection, the superior court determined that no
due process violation would arise from admitting Blandon’s out-ofcourt identification. 24 Relying upon the test set forth in Neil v. Big-

17. Perry, No. 08-S-1797-1798, at 2. The large box contained audio equipment. Id. at 2
n.1. Clavijo acted as a translator between Officer Clay and Blandon, as Blandon spoke only
in Spanish. Id. at 2.
18. Id. at 2–3.
19. Id. at 3.
20. Id.
21. Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2. Perry also argued that the
introduction of Blandon’s out-of-court identification would violate Part 1, Article 15 of the
New Hampshire Constitution, which also secures the accused’s right to due process. Perry,
No. 08-S-1797-1798, at 3; N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 15; see also, e.g., State v. Damiano, 474 A.2d
1045, 1047 (N.H. 1984) (stating that this article guarantees every citizen due process of
law). In addition to asking the court to suppress the out-of-court identification, Perry
moved to suppress any in-court identification by Blandon. Perry, No. 08-S-1797-1798, at 3.
Perry argued that an in-court identification would not have a basis independent of the
suggestive out-of-court identification. Id.
22. Perry, No. 08-S-1797-1798, at 3.
23. Id. at 4. Perry averred that the situation, in effect, constituted a “one-man showup.” Id. A show-up is an identification procedure where an officer shows a witness a single
suspect or a single photograph of that suspect. BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE
INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 55 (2011).
24. Perry, No. 08-S-1797-1798, at 3, 6.
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gers 25 and Manson v. Braithwaite, 26 the court explained that to determine the admissibility of eyewitness identification, it must engage in a
two-step inquiry. 27 Under this test, the court must first consider
“whether the identification procedure was unnecessarily suggestive.” 28
If the court answers this question in the affirmative, it must then and
only then determine whether the identification was nonetheless reliable. 29 The court concluded that Blandon’s identification of Perry was
not the result of suggestive, police-arranged procedures 30 because
nothing Officer Clay did caused Blandon to identify Perry. 31 Finding
no police-arranged suggestiveness, the court did not consider whether
the identification was independently reliable. 32 The court admitted
Blandon’s out-of-court identification at trial. 33 Perry was subsequently
convicted of theft by unauthorized taking. 34

25. 409 U.S. 188, 199–200 (1972).
26. 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977).
27. Perry, No. 08-S-1797-1798, at 3. The term “two-step inquiry” is not equivalent to
“due process constraint.” The two-step inquiry is a test used by courts to determine whether the due process constraint will prevent eyewitness identification evidence from being
introduced. See infra Part II.A.
28. Perry, No. 08-S-1797-1798, at 3 (quoting State v. Cyr, 453 A.2d 1315, 1317 (N.H.
1982)).
29. Id. at 3–4.
30. The term “police-arranged” is somewhat ambiguous in this context as it may connote either intention with regard to the arrangement itself (that is, the police intended to
conduct a show-up), or intention with regard to the suggestion (that is, police intended to
suggest that the defendant was the individual who committed a crime). The Supreme
Court’s majority opinion in Perry seemed to suggest that both are needed. See infra Part III.
This Note uses “police-arranged” to connote that police the least intentionally arranged
the confrontation between the witness and the accused. Therefore, “police-arranged”
does not refer to instances where police inadvertently caused the confrontation between
the witness and the accused. Moreover, it does not include instances where someone other than the police arranged the circumstances, regardless of whether that person did so
intentionally.
31. Perry, No. 08-S-1797-1798, at 4.
32. Id. at 5.
33. Id. The court also admitted Blandon’s in-court identification on similar grounds.
Id.
34. State v. Perry, No. 2009-0590, slip op. at 1 (N.H. Nov. 18, 2010), aff’d, Perry v. New
Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716 (2012). Perry was initially charged with one count of theft by
unauthorized taking and one count of criminal mischief. Perry, No. 08-S-1797-1798, at 1.

2013]

PERRY v. NEW HAMPSHIRE

575

Perry appealed his conviction to the New Hampshire Supreme
Court, contending that the admission of Blandon’s out-of-court identification violated his due process rights as secured by state and federal constitutions. 35 Relying on the same two-step inquiry as the lower
court, the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that no due process
violation occurred because Blandon’s out-of-court identification was
not the result of suggestive, police-arranged procedures. 36 Because
Perry failed to demonstrate that the identification resulted from police-arranged suggestiveness, the court did not reach the second step
and declined to consider the reliability of the identification. 37 The
court affirmed the superior court’s denial of Perry’s motion. 38
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to determine whether the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
requires trial courts to conduct preliminary judicial screenings of the
reliability of eyewitness identifications made under suggestive circumstances not arranged by police. 39
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Since its inception, the due process framework for analyzing the
admissibility of eyewitness testimony has gone largely unchanged in
Supreme Court jurisprudence. 40 Part II.A of this Note traces the Supreme Court’s development of the due process constraint. Part II.B
explains how, relying on the Supreme Court’s due process jurisprudence, state and lower federal courts have adopted divergent approaches under the due process framework, using either fairnessbased or deterrence-based rationales. Part II.C describes how the
New Jersey Supreme Court took a rather unique approach by revising
the due process framework in light of emerging scientific findings
concerning the reliability of eyewitness testimony.

35. State v. Perry, No. 2009-0590, slip op. at 1.
36. Id. at 1–2.
37. Id. at 2.
38. Id.
39. Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 723 (2012).
40. See infra Part II.A.
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A. The Supreme Court Developed a Two-Part Test to Determine Whether
Due Process Requires Suppression of Eyewitness Identification
Evidence
As early as 1967, the Supreme Court was aware that certain pretrial occurrences “might well settle the accused’s fate and reduce the
trial itself to a mere formality.” 41 The Court noted that “[t]he vagaries
of eyewitness identification are well-known,” and recognized the vast
number of miscarriages of justice stemming from mistaken identifications. 42 Additionally, the Court recognized that state-created suggestive witness identifications may have substantially contributed to this
miscarriage. 43 To prevent such miscarriages of justice, the Court, in a
series of decisions made on the same day, recognized two constitutional protections. 44
The Court in United States v. Wade 45 recognized that the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel 46 extended to pretrial confrontations between the accused and adverse witnesses. 47 The Court
reasoned that it must scrutinize such confrontations “to determine
whether the presence of . . . counsel is necessary to preserve the defendant’s basic right to a fair trial as affected by his right meaningfully
to cross-examine” adverse witnesses. 48 Thus, under Wade, courts were
to exclude identification evidence obtained in the absence of and

41. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967).
42. Id. at 228.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 236–37 (recognizing a Sixth Amendment right to counsel at pretrial
lineups); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301–02 (1967) (recognizing, in addition to the
holding in Wade, an independent due process constraint on the admissibility of eyewitness
testimony).
45. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
46. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
47. Wade, 388 U.S. at 236–37. The Wade decision was released on the same day as Gilbert v. California, which also dealt with a constitutional right to counsel at pretrial lineups.
338 U.S. 263, 264–265 (1967).
48. Wade, 388 U.S. at 227. The Court was concerned that a defendant would be unable to attack the credibility of a pretrial lineup if it was conducted in the absence of defendant’s counsel, because a defendant on his own may not be able to demonstrate that
the lineup procedure suggestively signaled to the witness that the defendant was the culprit. Id. at 231–32.
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without notice to counsel, unless the identification had an independent source of reliability. 49
In addition to the exclusionary rule of Wade, the Supreme Court
in Stovall v. Denno 50 recognized a due process constraint 51 on the admissibility of eyewitness identifications. 52 The Court explained that a
defendant was entitled to relief when the “confrontation conducted . . . was so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable
mistaken identification that [the defendant] was denied due process
of law.” 53 The Court explained that determining whether the confrontation was overly suggestive depends upon the totality of the circumstances. 54 In Stovall the police brought the handcuffed defendant
to the hospital room where a victim of the crime was recovering. 55
The Court concluded that no due process violation had occurred be-

49. See id. at 236–37, 242 (finding that the lineup should not have been conducted
without notice to and the presence of counsel, and remanding the case to the District
Court to determine whether the witness’s in-court identification of Wade had an independent source). To determine whether an identification had an independent source,
the Court explained that it ought to consider:
[T]he prior opportunity to observe the alleged criminal act, the existence of any
discrepancy between any pre-lineup description and the defendant’s actual description, any identification prior to lineup of another person, the identification
by picture of the defendant prior to the lineup, failure to identify the defendant
on a prior occasion, and the lapse of time between the alleged act and the lineup
identification.
Id. at 241.
50. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
51. The Court indicated that the due process constraint was tied to Fourteenth
Amendment rights rather than Fifth Amendment rights by referencing Palmer v. Peyton,
359 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1966). Stovall, 388 U.S. at 302; see Palmer, 359 F.2d at 200 (considering whether a voice identification procedure violated the defendant’s Fourteenth
Amendment due process rights).
52. Stovall, 388 U.S. at 301–02. Although this is the first Supreme Court case recognizing the constraint, the Court stated that “[t]his is a recognized ground of attack upon a
conviction independent of any right to counsel claim.” Id. at 302.
53. Id. at 301–02.
54. Id. at 302.
55. Id. at 295. The defendant was also the only black man present in the hospital
room. Id.

578

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:571

cause the confrontation was imperative given the victim’s critical condition. 56
In Simmons v. United States, 57 the Court again had occasion to consider an alleged due process violation, this time in the context of an
in-court identification following a pretrial identification by photograph. 58 The Court explained that in-court identifications following
pretrial identification procedures would be deemed inadmissible only
if the underlying identification procedure was “so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable
misidentification.” 59 Consistent with the Court’s language in Stovall, it
explained that “each case must be considered on its own facts.” 60 The
Court again found that, under the specific facts of the case, no due
process violation had occurred. 61 According to the Court, the photographic identification procedure used was necessary for law enforcement and, given that the witnesses saw the assailants for up to five
minutes under good lighting conditions, the identifications were likely reliable. 62
Although the Stovall Court initially recognized a due process constraint tied to the admissibility of eyewitness testimony, 63 the Supreme
Court did not have occasion to overturn a decision based on a viola-

56. Id. at 302. The Court concluded that the show-up was imperative because the victim was the only individual who could exonerate the defendant, and she might have died
in the hospital. Id.
57. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
58. Id. at 381.
59. Id. at 384.
60. Id.; cf. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967) (concluding that each alleged
due process violation case “depends on the totality of the circumstances”).
61. Simmons, 390 U.S. at 386.
62. Id. at 384–85. The Court explained that the procedure was necessary because the
FBI needed to develop leads as quickly as possible. Id. at 385. The Court indicated that its
approach accorded with Stovall. Id. at 384. Yet, “[t]he inquiry mandated by Simmons is
similar to the independent-source test used in Wade where an in-court identification is
sought following an uncounseled lineup.” Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 122 (1977)
(Marshall, J., dissenting). In both cases, the issue was whether the witness identified the
defendant solely on the basis of his memory of events at the time of the crime, or whether
he was merely remembering the person he picked out in a pretrial procedure.” Simmons,
390 U.S. at 383–84; Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 122.
63. Stovall, 388 U.S. at 301–02.
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tion of that constraint until Foster v. California. 64 Unlike Stovall and
Simmons, “this case present[ed the Court with] a compelling example
of unfair lineup procedures.” 65 In this instance, police first arranged
a lineup in which the defendant stood out physically from the other
individuals. 66 Moreover, while the witness thought the defendant was
among the individuals he had seen, the witness was unsure. 67 The police then arranged a one-on-one confrontation between the defendant and the witness. 68 The witness, however, remained uncertain as to
whether the defendant was one of the individuals he had seen. 69 Only
after arranging a second lineup, in which the defendant was the only
person who had been in the first lineup, was the witness confident in
his identification. 70 Explaining that the “suggestive elements in this
identification procedure made it all but inevitable that” the witness
would identify the defendant, the Court concluded that “[t]his procedure so undermined the reliability of the eyewitness identification
as to violate due process.” 71
The Court held, once again, that the admission of an in-court
identification following a pretrial identification procedure did not
give rise to likely misidentification of a defendant in Coleman v. Alabama. 72 In this instance, the witness claimed to have “got a real good
look” at his assailants “in the car lights” of a passing car. 73 The witness, however, gave only a vague and factually incorrect description of
his assailants prior to the pretrial lineup conducted by police. 74 When

64. 394 U.S. 440, 443–44 (1969).
65. Id. at 442.
66. Id. at 441. The defendant, who was nearly six feet tall, stood next to two other
men who were nearly half a foot shorter. Id. The defendant also wore a leather jacket similar to that allegedly worn by the perpetrator. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 441–42.
71. Id. at 443. According to the Court’s later evaluation of Foster in Biggers, the basis of
the exclusion was the “likelihood of misidentification.” Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198
(1972).
72. 399 U.S. 1, 5 (1970).
73. Id. at 4.
74. Id. The witness claimed that the assailants were “young, black males, close to the
same age and height.” Id. Although both defendants were black, there was an age difference of approximately ten years and a height difference of nearly a foot. Id.
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the police arranged a lineup, the witness, before the lineup even began, unequivocally identified the defendants as his assailants. 75 Although one of the defendants was the only individual in the pretrial
lineup wearing a hat, and the witness was previously unable to describe his assailants with certainty, the Court concluded that the incourt identification “did not stem from an identification procedure at
the lineup ‘so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.’” 76 To the contrary, the Court found that the facts supported the contention that the
in-court identification was “entirely based upon observations at the
time of the” incident. 77
The Court, in Neil v. Biggers, 78 made clear that unnecessary suggestiveness alone does not mandate the exclusion of identification evidence. 79 Rather, the Court developed a two-step test explaining that
if it first determined that the identification procedure was suggestive,
it must then consider “whether under the ‘totality of the circumstances’ the identification was [nonetheless] reliable.” 80 The Court noted,
the factors to be considered in evaluating the likelihood of
misidentification include the opportunity of the witness to
view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness’ prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by
the witness at the confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and the confrontation. 81
The Court explained that “[i]t is the likelihood of misidentification which violates a defendant’s right to due process.” 82 Basing its
decision on an application of the reliability factors it outlined, the

75. Id. at 5.
76. Id. at 4–6 (quoting Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968)). There
was no indication that law enforcement required the defendant to wear a hat. Id. at 6.
77. Id. at 5–6.
78. 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
79. Id. at 199.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 199–200.
82. Id. at 198. Accordingly, “the primary evil to be avoided is ‘a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.’” Id. (quoting Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S.
377, 384 (1968)).
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Court concluded that no due process violation occurred as a result of
a show-up conducted by police. 83
The Supreme Court reaffirmed the Biggers two-step test in Manson v. Brathwaite. 84 The first step, the Court explained, was to determine “whether the police used an impermissibly suggestive procedure
in obtaining the out-of-court identification.” 85 If a court answers this
in the affirmative, it must then determine “whether, under all the circumstances, that suggestive procedure gave rise to a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.” 86 The Court explained that
the basis for excluding identifications made under suggestive circumstances was a “concern that the jury not hear eyewitness testimony unless that evidence has aspects of reliability.” 87 As a result, the Court
concluded that “reliability is the linchpin” of whether eyewitness identifications are admissible. 88
B. Following the Supreme Court’s Eyewitness Jurisprudence, State and
Lower Federal Courts Diverged Between Fairness-Based and
Deterrence-Based Approaches
Looking to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Stovall and its progeny, lower federal and state courts are to consider whether, under the
totality of the circumstances, the identification procedure was so suggestive as to fatally taint the reliability of the resulting identification. 89
Although in each of the Supreme Court’s cases the suggestive circumstances were in some way arranged by police, the Court did not indicate whether the police arrangement was essential or incidental to its
holdings. 90 This failure resulted in divergent application of the due
process framework. 91 Some state and lower federal courts cast the jus-

83. Id. at 200–01.
84. 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977).
85. Id. at 107.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 112.
88. Id. at 114. Judged by the factors set forth in Biggers, the Court concluded that the
introduction of eyewitness testimony pertaining to a pretrial identification by a singlephotograph display did not violate the defendant’s due process rights. Id. at 114–17.
89. See supra Part II.A.
90. See supra Part II.A.
91. Compare Thigpen v. Cory, 804 F.2d 893, 895 (6th Cir. 1986) (determining that the
“deterrence of police misconduct [was] not the basic purpose for excluding identification
evidence”), with State v. Pailon, 590 A.2d 858, 860 (R.I. 1991) (“There seems little doubt
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tification for the due process constraint as a concern with reliability of
eyewitness testimony. 92 As a result, these jurisdictions have reasoned
that the framework is applicable to instances where the suggestive circumstances were unintentionally arranged by law enforcement and
where there was a complete absence of police arrangement. 93 By contrast, most state and lower federal courts interpret the constraint as
supported by a deterrence rationale. 94 Accordingly, these jurisdictions refuse to apply the constraint to instances where the suggestiveness is not police-arranged. 95
1. A Minority of Jurisdictions, Citing the Reliability Rationale, Apply
the Due Process Framework to Any Suggestive Circumstances,
Regardless of Whether Police Arranged Them
Basing their decisions on the constraint’s concern with securing
reliable eyewitness evidence, some state and federal jurisdictions have
reasoned that the constraint applies to suggestive circumstances irrespective of whether police arranged the circumstances intentionally. 96
For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in Green v. Loggins, 97 explained that “a court is obligated to review
every pre-trial encounter [under the due process framework], accidental
or otherwise, in order to insure that the circumstances of the particular encounter have not been so suggestive as to undermine the reliability of the . . . identification.” 98 In Green, the police accidentally
placed the defendant in the same holding cell as an eyewitness seek-

that the Court’s exclusionary rule relating to evidence obtained in violation of [due process] was directed entirely at the deterrence of illegal police procedures . . . .”).
92. See infra Part II.B.1.
93. See infra Part II.B.1.
94. See infra Part II.B.2.
95. See infra Part II.B.2.
96. See, e.g., United States v. Bouthot, 878 F.2d 1506, 1516 (1st Cir. 1989) (“Because
the due process focus in the identification context is on the fairness of the trial and not
exclusively on police deterrence, it follows that federal courts should scrutinize all suggestive identification procedures, not just those orchestrated by the police . . . .”); Thigpen,
804 F.2d at 895 (holding that the presence of state action was not necessary in order to
review admissibility); Green v. Loggins, 614 F.2d 219, 223 (9th Cir. 1980) (“[A] court is
obligated to review every pre-trial encounter, accidental or otherwise . . . .”).
97. 614 F. 2d 219 (9th Cir. 1980).
98. Id. at 223 (emphasis added).
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ing protective custody. 99 The witness “did not appear to recognize
[the defendant] until . . . a booking officer asked both [the witness]
and [the defendant] to identify themselves.” 100 The State maintained
that this encounter was above constitutional due process review because it would serve no deterrent purpose. 101 The court, however,
expressly rejected the notion that deterrence was a fundamental purpose of the constraint. 102 Rather, the court explained that the due
process constraint serves to ensure reliability. 103
Adopting the reasoning set forth in Green, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in Thigpen v. Cory, 104 agreed
that due process requires courts to review suggestive circumstances
even when there is no police arrangement. 105 The court reiterated
that “deterrence of police misconduct is not the basic purpose for excluding identification evidence.” 106 Basing its reasoning on the Supreme Court’s language in Biggers, the court explained that “only the
effects of, rather than the causes for” a pretrial encounter are determinative of whether the identification was irreparably suggestive. 107

99. Id. at 221.
100. Id. at 222.
101. Id. If the suggestion is the result of unintentional conduct, the conduct cannot be
deterred because unintentional acts, by their very nature, cannot be prevented.
102. Id.
103. Id. The court found that the admission of the witness’s in-court identification
lacked the requisite reliability, and that its admission was not harmless error. Id. at 225.
104. 804 F.2d 893 (6th Cir. 1986).
105. Id. at 895. In this case, the witness, who had been robbed by two men, encountered the defendant on three separate occasions. Id. at 894–95. First, although the defendant appeared in a pretrial lineup, the witness only identified another man, who happened to be the defendant’s brother. Id. at 894. Second, the witness saw the defendant
once again at the brother’s preliminary hearing. Id. at 895. Last, the witness saw the defendant at the brother’s trial, where the defendant at one point sat next to the witness. Id.
It was only at the trial that the witness told law enforcement that he recognized the defendant as the other assailant. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 895. The court concluded that the defendant’s due process rights were violated as a result of the admission of the witness’ identification testimony. Id. at 898. See
also Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198 (1972) (“It is the likelihood of misidentification
which violates a defendant’s right to due process . . . .”).
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2. Most Jurisdictions, Citing a Deterrence Rationale, Apply the Due
Process Framework Only to Instances Involving Police Arrangement
Most federal and state jurisdictions recognize the due process
framework’s deterrent purpose and, as a result, restrict its application
to instances involving police-arranged confrontations. 108 For example, the Third Circuit, in United States v. Zeiler, 109 reasoned that the
due process framework was not applicable “[w]hen . . . there [wa]s no
evidence that law enforcement officials encouraged or assisted in impermissive identification procedures.” 110 Finding no evidence suggesting that “the pretrial publicity [identifying the defendant as the
culprit] was controlled or directed by law enforcement,” the court
concluded that the eyewitness made a competent identification of the
defendant. 111 Reasoning that the Supreme Court’s Wade and Simmons
decisions “were concerned with the conduct of law enforcement officials,” the court found that eyewitness testimony should be admitted
when law enforcement did not participate in the identification procedure. 112
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island, in State v. Pailon, 113 explained that suggestive circumstances caused by private individuals
did not invoke the protections of the due process constraint. 114 In
Pailon, a citizen approached the witness, who had been assaulted and
robbed while working at her jewelry store, and told her the names of

108. See, e.g., State v. Holliman, 570 A.2d 680, 684 (Conn. 1990) (“[I]t is well established that conduct that may fairly be characterized as state action is a necessary predicate
to a challenge under the due process clause . . . .”); Wilson v. Commonwealth, 695 S.W.2d
854, 857 (Ky. 1985) (“Implicit in the first prong of the Biggers test is a finding that the government had some hand in arranging the confrontation.”); State v. Birch, 41,979, p. 7 (La.
App. 2 Cir. 5/9/07), 956 So.2d 793, 800 (holding that due process is not implicated unless
there is a showing of state action); State v. Pailon, 590 A.2d 858, 863 (R.I. 1991) (“[A]bsent
state action, no constitutional violation that would give rise to the creation of an exclusionary rule has been committed.”).
109. 470 F.2d 717 (3d Cir. 1972).
110. Id. at 720.
111. Id. at 718–19.
112. Id. at 720. The court reasoned that excluding eyewitness testimony based on pretrial publicity would impose an untenable duty on law enforcement to prevent news
sources from publishing photographs of arrested individuals. Id.
113. 590 A.2d 858 (R.I. 1991).
114. Id. at 861.
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the men who had robbed her. 115 When the citizen brought the victim
a photograph of the defendant, the victim “instantly” identified the
man in the photograph as her assailant. 116 In determining whether to
apply the due process framework, the court noted that “[t]here seems
little doubt that the [Supreme] Court’s exclusionary rule . . . was directed entirely at the deterrence of illegal police procedures.” 117 The
court supported its statement by noting that in every case in the Supreme Court’s eyewitness jurisprudence, the “offending conduct . . .
was carried out by governmental rather than private action.” 118 Because the conduct at issue in this case was carried out by private individuals, the court determined that it need not apply the due process
framework as no constitutional violation occurred in the admission of
the eyewitness’s identification. 119
C. The New Jersey Supreme Court Revised Its Due Process Framework in
Response to the Significant Doubt That Developments in Social Science
Cast on the Reliability of Eyewitness Testimony
Recognizing that developments in social science have cast doubt
upon the long-standing due process framework, the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Henderson 120 revised its test for evaluating the
reliability of an eyewitness’s identification. 121 The court pointed to
recent research, which it thought convincingly demonstrated that
commonly held notions about the reliability of human memory are
oversimplified. 122 The current test for evaluating eyewitness identifi-

115. Id. at 859–60. The citizen claimed to know who had robbed her because the same
individuals had also robbed his mother. Id. at 860.
116. Id. The victim turned the photograph over to a security guard employed at the
store, who in turn gave it to the police department. Id. The police arranged a lineup
some time later and the victim, after several minutes of studying the individuals in the
lineup, identified the defendant. Id. Although it took her several minutes to make this
identification, the victim testified that she recognized the defendant instantly but wanted
to be sure of her identification. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 861–62.
119. Id. at 863.
120. 27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011).
121. Id. at 877–78.
122. Id. at 894.
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cations, 123 the court explained, neither accurately measures reliability
nor sufficiently deters police misconduct. 124 To remedy the test’s
shortcomings, the court proposed a revised due process framework
that would require courts to first consider both “system and estimator
variables” and second to redevelop jury instructions to help jurors accurately assess the value of eyewitness testimony. 125
To begin, the court noted the substantial evidence suggesting
that eyewitness identifications are perhaps the most unreliable form
of evidence used in criminal cases. 126 The substantial number of eyewitness misidentifications, the court explained, “stem from the fact
that human memory is malleable.” 127 According to the court, scientific research demonstrates “that an array of variables can affect and
dilute memory and lead to misidentifications.” 128 These variables are
divided into two subcategories: (1) system variables, and (2) estimator
variables. 129 System variables are those “which are within the control
of the criminal justice system.” 130 In contrast, “estimator variables are
factors beyond the control of the criminal justice system,” for example, stress and race bias. 131 Both sets of factors, however, “can alter
memory and affect eyewitness identifications.” 132
The court explained that the current framework for identifying
due process violations based on suggestive police procedures that was
set out in Brathwaite inadequately addressed reliability and did not suf-

123. The current test is the approach adopted by the Supreme Court in Manson v.
Brathwaite. Id. at 889; see also supra Part II.A.
124. Henderson, 27 A.3d at 918.
125. Id. at 919 (emphasis omitted). For a discussion of system and estimator variables,
see infra notes 129–131 and accompanying text.
126. Id. at 885–86.
127. Id. at 888.
128. Id. at 895.
129. Id.
130. Id. The court listed several system variables, including blind administration, preidentification instructions, lineup construction, avoiding feedback and recording confidence, and multiple viewings. Id. at 896–901. It also noted that its list of system variables
was non-exhaustive and was expected to expand in light of scientific research. Id. at 922.
131. Id. at 904. Other estimator variables include weapon focus, duration of observation, distance and lighting, witness characteristics, characteristics of the perpetrator,
memory decay, and the conduct of private actors. Id. at 904–09.
132. Id. at 922.
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ficiently deter inappropriate police conduct. 133 According to the
court, the Brathwaite framework ignores the effect that estimator variable can have on reliability in the absence of suggestive police arrangement. 134 Furthermore, some of the Brathwaite test relies in part
on the eyewitnesses to self-report, but the suggestive procedures and
circumstances themselves can adversely affect this self-reporting. 135
The court noted that the Brathwaite approach also has the rather perverse effect of rewarding police suggestiveness. 136 According to the
New Jersey court, the more suggestive the procedures employed, the
more likely the witness is to both appear confident in his assertions
and self-report better viewing opportunities. 137
To better account for reliability and provide for more meaningful deterrence, the court proposed a revised framework. 138 The New
Jersey court explained that if a defendant can show suggestiveness
139
tied to a system variable, then a court should explore all relevant
system and estimator variables at a pretrial hearing. 140 In this situation, although the state must proffer evidence demonstrating that the
identification is reliable and accounts for both system and estimator
variables, “the ultimate burden remains on the defendant to prove a
very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.” 141 The
court explained that “broader [pretrial] hearings will provide more
meaningful deterrence [and] will address reliability with greater care
and better reflect how memory works.” 142
In some regards, the New Jersey test is similar to that of deterrence-based approaches in that it restricts pretrial hearings to instances involving police. 143 What makes this approach distinct, however, is partly its recognition that courts need to rethink the variables

133. Id. at 918.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 919.
139. A system variable is within the control of the criminal justice system. See supra note
130.
140. Id. at 919–20.
141. Id. at 920
142. Id. at 922.
143. See id. at 920 (requiring that the initial showing of suggestiveness come from a system, or a criminal-justice-system-controlled, variable); see also infra Part II.B.2.
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that affect reliability, including variables that are not within the control of law enforcement. 144
Additionally, the New Jersey court suggested that courts use revised jury instructions to help jurors weigh the value of eyewitness testimony. 145 According to the court, jurors have an incomplete understanding of how memory works. Although “[e]veryone knows . . . that
bad lighting conditions make it more difficult to perceive the details
of a person’s face,” jurors generally lack knowledge of how many of
the system and estimator variables affect memory and therefore reliability. 146 Thus, the court called for revised jury instructions to better
explain the effects both system and estimator variables have on the reliability of eyewitness identification. 147
The court’s approach, driven in part by advances social science,
revised the manner in which New Jersey courts measure reliability and
aimed to provide jurors with a foundation to weigh eyewitness testimony. 148 Although this approach restricted pretrial review of eyewitness identifications to instances involving police conduct, it rethought
how police conduct may affect reliability. 149 Furthermore, the court’s
directive to revise jury instructions was motivated by a desire to give
jurors a better platform from which to evaluate eyewitness testimony
by providing them with an enhanced understanding of how memory
works. 150
III. THE COURT’S REASONING
In Perry v. New Hampshire, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the New Hampshire Supreme Court, concluding that the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require
courts to conduct preliminary judicial screenings of the reliability of
144. See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 919 (advocating for consideration of system and estimator variables). For examples of the factors law enforcement control, see supra note 130.
145. Henderson, 27 A.3d at 919. The court referred the task of revising jury instructions
to two state committees. Id. at 925.
146. Id. at 910. The jury instructions used in this case, for example, did not mention
that a witness’s level of certainty might be affected by the construction of the lineup. See
id. at 882–83 (excerpting the model jury instructions given at trial).
147. Id. at 925–26.
148. Id. at 919.
149. Id. at 896–903, 920. A more thorough pretrial hearing will also provide for more
meaningful deterrence. Id. at 922.
150. Id. at 911, 919.
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eyewitness identifications where there is an absence of policearranged suggestiveness. 151 Writing for the majority, Justice Ginsburg
noted that the Court has recognized and applied the due process
constrain when an identification was procured through suggestive,
police-arranged circumstances. 152 Reasoning that police arrangement
was essential to the decisions in the Court’s eyewitness identification
jurisprudence, the majority explained that the framework had not,
and would not, be extended to include suggestive circumstances not
arranged by police. 153 The majority was concerned that expanding
the application of the due process framework would overburden lower federal and state courts, particularly with regard to pretrial screenings. 154 This practical concern aside, the majority also was mindful of
the fact that determining the weight of eyewitness testimony fell within the purview of the jury. 155 Furthermore, the majority recognized
that a defendant is protected from the effects of unreliable eyewitness
testimony by certain federal and state laws. 156
Summarizing its eyewitness identification jurisprudence, the majority explained that the Court has tied the due process constraint on
the admissibility of eyewitness testimony to suggestive, police-arranged
circumstances. 157 The Court, however, asserted that a showing of police-arranged suggestiveness in the procurement of an eyewitness’s
identification does not itself mandate exclusion. 158 Rather courts
must consider whether, in light of the surrounding circumstances, the
identification was nonetheless reliable. 159 That is, due process operates “[o]nly when evidence is so extremely unfair that its admission
violates fundamental conceptions of justice.” 160
Noting that the decisions of prior eyewitness admissibility cases
“turn[ed] on the presence of state action and aim[ed] to deter police
from rigging identification procedures,” the majority explained that

151. Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 730 (2012).
152. Id. at 720.
153. Id. at 720–21.
154. Id. at 727.
155. Id. at 720.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 723–25.
158. Id. at 724.
159. Id. at 724–25.
160. Id. at 723 (quoting Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352 (1990)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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police-arranged suggestiveness was a necessary predicate to the application of the due process framework. 161 The Court reasoned that it
had not, and would not expand the scope of the constraint to include
all suggestive circumstances because the deterrence rationale would
be wholly irrelevant in the absence of improper police conduct. 162
After criticizing the reasoning of Perry and the dissent, both of
which argued that police arrangement was not essential for a show-up
to violate due process, the majority expressed an additional concern
that expanding the scope of the process protections would overburden the judicial system. 163 The Court recognized that most, if not all,
identifications involve some degree of suggestion. 164 As a result, if the
scope of due process was enlarged to include all suggestive circumstances, then courts would be forced into holding pretrial hearings on
a routine basis. 165
The Court’s unwillingness to enlarge the scope of the due process protections rested largely on its recognition that the jury’s role is
to determine the weight of evidence. 166 Furthermore, the Court rec161. Id. at 720–21. The majority supported this conclusion by reference to three cases
in its eyewitness identification jurisprudence: Brathwaite, Coleman, and Wade. Id. at 725–27.
According to the majority, Brathwaite stands for the proposition that no due process concern arises unless there are suggestive, police-arranged circumstances. Id. at 726. The majority explained that deterrence was a fundamental aim of the Brathwaite Court’s decision.
Id.; see Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 112 (1977) (“The second factor [motivating exclusion] is deterrence.”). The majority also pointed to Coleman, explaining that “[n]o due
process violation occurred [in that case] because nothing ‘the police said or did prompted’” the identification. Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 726 (quoting Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 6
(1970)). The majority also supported its conclusion with the language of Wade, reasoning
that the Court in that case was responding to the dangers of “police rigging” when it recognized the defendant’s right to counsel at pretrial lineups. Id. at 726–27; see United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967) (“A major factor contributing to the high incidence of miscarriage of justice from mistaken identification has been the degree of suggestion inherent in the manner in which the prosecution presents the suspect to witnesses for
pretrial identification.” (emphasis added)). The Court also noted that all the cases in its
eyewitness identification jurisprudence involved suggestive procedures that were arranged
by police. Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 721 n.1.
162. See id. at 720–21 (noting that the deterrence rationale is the driving force behind
the constraint).
163. Id. at 727.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 728.
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ognized that federal and state safeguards protect a defendant against
the effects of dubious eyewitness testimony by affording the defendant other means to persuade the jury. 167 Among these safeguards are
the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront an adverse witness, Sixth Amendment right to counsel, eyewitness-specific jury instructions, and state and federal rules of evidence. 168 These safeguards, the Court explained, caution jurors against the hazards of
eyewitness testimony, allowing them to better evaluate the weight of
such evidence. 169 The Court concluded that, in the absence of policearranged suggestiveness, these safeguards suffice to challenge the reliability of eyewitness testimony. 170 Finding no suggestive, policearranged circumstances and that the trial-level safeguards it had outlined were successfully applied, the Court affirmed the decision of the
New Hampshire Supreme Court and concluded that no due process
violation occurred as a result of the admission of Blandon’s identification testimony. 171
In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Thomas argued that
Stovall v. Denno and its progeny were incorrectly decided and therefore should not be extended to the case at hand. 172 Justice Thomas
explained that the aforementioned cases were “premised on a substantive due process right to fundamental fairness.” 173 According to
Justice Thomas, however, the Fourteenth Amendment “is not a secret
repository of substantive guarantees against unfairness.” 174 Although
he ultimately agreed with the majority that due process extends only
to cases involving suggestive, police-arranged procedures, he would
limit the majority’s use of Stovall and its progeny to their specific
facts. 175
Justice Sotomayor, in dissent, argued that the majority incorrectly
determined that the due process constraint extends only to cases involving suggestive, police-arranged circumstances. 176 The majority, in

167. Id. at 728–29.
168. Id.; see, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 403; N.H. R. EVID. 403 (2011).
169. Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 728–29 (2012).
170. Id. at 721.
171. Id. at 726, 730.
172. Id. at 730 (Thomas, J., concurring).
173. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
174. Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 731 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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Justice Sotomayor’s view, mistakenly identified deterrence as the primary aim underlying due process. 177 In contrast, Justice Sotomayor
maintained that the driving force behind Wade and Stovall was the desire to ensure that the jury heard only reliable evidence. 178 Sotomayor
argued that the due process issue raised in previous eyewitness identification cases lay in the negative effects suggestion had on the fairness
of a trial, and not, as the majority suggested, in the act of suggestion
itself. 179
Justice Sotomayor worried that the majority had fashioned a new
and substantial limitation on a long-standing due process protection
by restricting its application to instances involving police-arranged
suggestion. 180 According to Justice Sotomayor, the majority did not
hold simply that identifications must arise out of the conduct of police to trigger the due process constraint, but rather that the suggestive circumstances must be police-arranged. 181 By requiring that the
suggestion itself be intentionally police-arranged, Justice Sotomayor
argued that the majority had attached a mens rea requirement onto
the due process analysis. 182 Justice Sotomayor argued that this new
approach fails to recognize that intentional- and inadvertent-police
suggestion result in the same due process concern: the increased likelihood of misidentification. 183 As a result, Justice Sotomayor argued
that due process is equally applicable in these instances. 184
Justice Sotomayor also challenged the majority’s assumption that
enlarging the scope of due process would entail a practical burden on
the courts. 185 The defendant, Justice Sotomayor explained, still carries the burden of demonstrating the overly suggestive circumstanc-

177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 733.
181. Id. at 734. Justice Sotomayor alternatively described such circumstances as “policerigg[ed], police-designed, or police-organized.” Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
182. Id. As Justice Sotomayor explained, under the majority’s approach, the intent of
law enforcement is controlling. Id.
183. Id. at 731–32.
184. Id. at 735. Justice Sotomayor did not address whether due process protections
should apply to suggestive circumstances in which there is an absence of police action. Id.
at 731 n.1.
185. Id. at 737.
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es. 186 And, as she pointed out, the Court has “set a high bar for suppression” of eyewitness identification. 187 Furthermore, because a defendant may rely upon evidentiary rules and raise objections at or before trial, courts are already required to entertain objections about
admitting eyewitness evidence. 188 Finally, Justice Sotomayor pointed
out that there has been no flood of claims in jurisdictions that apply
due process protections to all suggestive circumstance, thus the majority’s concern that expanding the scope of the constraint would significantly overburden the courts was unfounded. 189
The majority’s reliance on the jury to ultimately weigh eyewitness
testimony was not persuasive, according to Justice Sotomayor. 190 Jurors, as she pointed out, are easily swayed by the testimony of an eyewitness. 191 Furthermore, scientific literature suggests that the jurors’
ability to weigh testimony is severely complicated by a witness’s false
sense of confidence, which is inflated by suggestiveness. 192 These
concerns aside, Justice Sotomayor pointed out that the majority’s reliance on jurors to weigh eyewitness testimony was an argument that
had appeared in dissent after dissent in previous decisions. 193 Those
arguments ultimately failed, and Justice Sotomayor saw no need to revive them in the instant case. 194
While there may have been reasons why the identification evidence in Perry’s case was in fact reliable, Justice Sotomayor explained
that the Court’s new approach meant that those reasons would never
be examined. 195 Justice Sotomayor concluded that the majority’s fail-

186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 737–38.
190. Id. at 737.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 738–39.
193. Id. at 737; see, e.g., Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 447 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting) (“[T]he jury must . . . be allowed to hear eyewitnesses and decide for itself whether it
can recognize the truth and whether they are telling the truth.”); Simmons v. United
States, 390 U.S. 377, 395 (1968) (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“The weight of the evidence . . . is not a question for the Court but for the jury . . . .”).
194. Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 737 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
195. Id. at 739.
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ure to assess the reliability of Blandon’s testimony was wrong and that
the case should be remanded. 196
IV. ANALYSIS
In Perry v. New Hampshire, the Supreme Court determined that
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require courts to conduct preliminary judicial screenings of the reliability of an eyewitness identification when the identification was not the
result of suggestive, police-arranged procedures. 197 The majority in
Perry erred in identifying deterrence as a fundamental aim of the due
process constraint. 198 As Justice Sotomayor pointed out in dissent,
due process protections arose out of a concern for ensuring the reliability of an eyewitness identification. 199 The majority misinterpreted
its own eyewitness jurisprudence by concluding that deterrence was
fundamental to these decisions and by improperly relying on the fact
that such cases happened to involve police arrangement. 200 Given the
significant scientific doubt cast upon the reliability of eyewitness testimony, the Court should have reevaluated the manner in which it
measures reliability, much like the New Jersey Supreme Court did. 201
The Court’s approach, however, ought to be more expansive than
that of New Jersey, and should apply the revised due process framework to all suggestive circumstances. 202

196. Id. at 740. Justice Sotomayor did not offer her opinion on whether Blandon’s
identification of Perry was reliable. Id. at 739.
197. Id. at 730 (majority opinion).
198. See infra Part IV.A.
199. Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 735 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see supra Part III. Although this
Note adopts Justice Sotomayor’s evaluation of the Court’s eyewitness jurisprudence, it departs from her approach in a two significant ways. First, whereas Justice Sotomayor did not
address whether all suggestive circumstances warrant an application of the due process
protections, this Note argues they do. See supra note 184. Second, this Note argues for a
revised due process framework that completely abandons the current measures of reliability. See infra Part IV.B.2.
200. See infra Part IV.A.
201. See infra Part IV.B.1.; see also supra Part II.C.
202. See infra Part IV.B.2.
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A. Because of Its Misguided Focus on Police Arrangement, the Perry
Court Mistakenly Identified Deterrence as a Primary Aim of Due
Process
The majority erred in its conclusion that deterrence is a primary
aim of the due process constraint. 203 Due process protections arose
not out of the Court’s concern with deterring police arrangement,
but rather out of the Court’s concern with ensuring the reliability of
an eyewitness’s identification. 204 In reaching its conclusion, the majority incorrectly interpreted the Court’s eyewitness identification jurisprudence and incorrectly relied upon the fact that the cases comprising this jurisprudence involved police arrangement. 205 Although
the Court’s eyewitness identification jurisprudence reflected a concern about the “corrupting effect[s]” of suggestion on reliability, 206
the majority’s decision narrowed the focus to police-arranged suggestive circumstances. 207 The majority also placed too much emphasis on
the fact that these cases involved police arrangement, for it failed to
recognize that this merely reflects a practical fact of criminal proceedings. 208
The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that the underlying concern of due process, first introduced in Stovall, is the Court’s
interest in ensuring the reliability of eyewitness identifications. 209

203. See Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 726 (majority opinion) (finding that “[a] primary aim of excluding identification evidence . . . is to deter law enforcement”).
204. Id. at 735 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
205. See id. at 721, 725–27 (majority opinion) (noting that previous decisions focused
on the presence of state action, disagreeing with the contention that the presence of police action in prior cases was mere coincidence, and arguing that a primary aim of exclusion was deterrence of improper police conduct).
206. Id. at 735 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (alteration in original).
207. Id. at 731.
208. See id. at 735 (“The vast majority of eyewitness identifications . . . use[d] in criminal prosecutions are obtained in lineup, showup, and photograph displays arranged by the
police.”).
209. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301–302 (1967) (recognizing that due process
may be violated when a confrontation was so suggestive that it led to a likely mistaken
identification); Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 111–12 (1977) (noting that “[t]he driving force behind . . . Stovall . . . was the Court’s concern with the problems of eyewitness
identification”); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198 (1972) (explaining that “[i]t is . . . apparent that the primary evil to be avoided is a very substantial likelihood of irreparable
misidentification” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

596

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:571

Stovall, according to the Court’s subsequent evaluation in Brathwaite,
reflected the Court’s concern that jurors not hear eyewitness testimony when such testimony lacks reliability. 210 Likewise, in Biggers, the
Court identified “the primary evil to be avoided,” as the increased
“likelihood of irreparable misidentification.” 211 As the Biggers Court
explained, “[i]t is the likelihood of misidentification which violates a
defendant’s right to due process.” 212 Furthermore, it is on this basis
that the Court excluded, for the first and only time, the proposed
eyewitness testimony in Foster. 213 Finally, in its most recent eyewitnessrelated decision prior to Perry, the Court concluded that “reliability is
the linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony.” 214
In other words, the Court’s due process concern lies in the effects suggestion may have on the reliability of an eyewitness’s identification. 215 The majority, however, recast this interest by claiming that
a primary concern of the Court lies in the source, rather than the effect, of the suggestion. 216 In concluding that deterrence is a fundamental aim of due process protections, the Perry Court misinterpreted
Brathwaite, Coleman, and Wade. 217 The majority’s reliance on Brathwaite
to support its contention that deterrence is a primary aim of the due
process constraint is inappropriate, for the Court only discussed deterrence in this instance “because Brathwaite challenged [the
Court’s] two-step inquiry as lacking deterrence value.” 218 Furthermore, the Brathwaite Court only listed deterrence as the “second fac-

210. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 111–12.
211. Biggers, 409 U.S. 198.
212. Id.
213. Id.; see Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 737 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (recognizing that “Foster is
the only case in which [the Court has] found a due process violation”).
214. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 114 (emphasis added).
215. Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 732.
216. Id. at 731. If the source of the suggestion is not law enforcement, no deterrable
conduct took place; law enforcement officers cannot prevent something from occurring
when it is outside of their control. Therefore, if deterrence is a “primary aim,” as the majority argued, the source of the suggestion must be law enforcement. See id. at 726 (majority opinion) (“A primary aim of excluding identification evidence obtained under unnecessarily suggestive circumstances . . . is to deter law enforcement . . . .”).
217. See id. at 725–27 (interpreting these three cases).
218. Id. at 726, 736 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 111–12.
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tor.” 219 As Justice Sotomayor pointed out, this language neither indicates that deterrence is a “primary aim” of the constraint, nor suggests
that deterrence is absolutely essential to the Brathwaite holding. 220
The majority also incorrectly reasoned that no due process violation occurred in Coleman “because nothing ‘the police said or did
prompted’” the identification. 221 As Justice Sotomayor pointed out,
the majority took this language out of context, for it was originally
used to further the contention that the witness’s identification was reliable. 222 No due process violation occurred in Coleman because the
“identifications were entirely based upon observations at the time of
the assault,” not merely because there was an absence of suggestive
police conduct in arranging the lineup. 223 Furthermore, the majority’s interpretation of this case conflicts with its earlier assessment of
Coleman in Biggers. The Biggers Court explained that the witness’s
identification was admissible in Coleman because the “evidence could
support a finding that the in-court identification was ‘entirely based
upon observations at the time of the assault.’” 224
Lastly, the majority incorrectly concluded that “the risk of police
rigging was the very danger to which the” Wade Court was responding
when it recognized a right to counsel during lineup procedures. 225
To the contrary, the Wade Court fashioned an exclusionary rule to
minimize the potential that a conviction would rest upon a misidentification. 226 The majority’s reading of Wade also conflicts with the

219. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 112.
220. Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 736.
221. See id. at 726 (majority opinion) (quoting Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 6
(1970)) (explaining the rationale behind the Coleman decision).
222. Id. at 736 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see also Coleman, 399 U.S. at 5–6 (explaining
that the defendant’s claim that the identification was unreliable as a result of unnecessarily
suggestive police procedures had no merit because the procedures used were not suggestive).
223. Coleman, 399 U.S. at 5–6.
224. Biggers. 409 U.S. at 197–98 (quoting Coleman, 399 U.S. at 5–6).
225. See Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 726–27 (majority opinion) (discussing the Wade rationale).
226. See Stovall, 388 U.S. at 297 (“A conviction which rests on a mistaken identification
is a gross miscarriage of justice. The Wade . . . rule[ is] aimed at minimizing that possibility . . . .”).
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Brathwaite Court’s prior assessment of the case, since that Court explained how concerns of reliability drove the decision in Wade. 227
Aside from its improper reading of previous Supreme Court cases, the majority incorrectly relied upon the fact that there are no instances in its eyewitness jurisprudence where suggestion was caused by
anyone other than law enforcement. 228 While true, the Court in its
previous due process cases was concerned not with the sources of suggestive conduct, but rather with the effects of this conduct on reliability. 229 Police arrangement was discussed in the earlier cases simply
because police conduct was present in some form. 230 Moreover, considering that there have only been a handful of Supreme Court cases
involving due process protections, it is unsurprising that this handful
of cases involved police arrangement. 231 Of the thousands of eyewitness identifications the State seeks to introduce each year, “[t]he vast
majority . . . are obtained [through identification procedures] arranged by the police.” 232 The majority failed to recognize this practical fact and, therefore, erred in holding that the source, rather than
the effect, of suggestion drove the result in these cases.
B. In the Face of Significant Scientific Criticism of Due Process, the
Perry Court Should Have Revised the Current Measures of Reliability
and Included All Suggestive Circumstances Within the Scope of the
Constraint
In reaching its conclusion, the majority relied on the same outmoded test that the Court promulgated nearly forty years ago in Biggers. 233 Given that the current framework has been the subject of
longstanding scientific criticism, however, the Court should have

227. See Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 112 (“Wade and its companion cases reflect the concern
that the jury not hear eyewitness testimony unless that evidence has aspects of reliability.”).
228. See Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 721, n.1 (noting that the Court had never required pretrial
screening absent police involvement).
229. See id. at 731 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Our due process concern . . . arises not
from the act of suggestion, but rather from the corrosive effects of suggestion on the reliability of the resulting identification.”).
230. See supra Part II.A.
231. See Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 735 (discussing the “practical reality” that police are often
involved in obtaining identifications).
232. Id.
233. Id. at 724 (majority opinion).
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reevaluated this framework. 234 Much like the New Jersey Supreme
Court, the majority should have redefined the manner in which it
evaluates reliability. 235 Moreover, to ensure reliability of eyewitness
evidence, the Perry Court should have adopted a broader approach
than that of New Jersey by including all suggestive circumstances within the scope of the revised due process constraint. 236
1. Similar to the New Jersey Supreme Court, the Perry Court Should
Have Redefined Its Current Measures of Reliability
Rather than continuing to rely upon the same due process
framework, the Court should have reconsidered, in light of longstanding scientific criticism, the manner in which it evaluates the reliability
of eyewitness identification. That is, the Court should have adopted
the system and estimator variables outlined in Henderson, 237 rather
than continue to use the five factors outlined in Biggers. 238 Although
the due process concern lies in ensuring reliability of eyewitness testimony, the Court has remained stagnant by continuing to use an approach that does not adequately measure reliability.
As the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized in Henderson, eyewitness identifications are perhaps the most unreliable form of evidence used in criminal trials. 239 This assertion is supported, the court
explained, by the relationship between misidentifications and wrongful convictions. 240 For example, of the defendants who have been exonerated on the basis of post-conviction DNA analysis, nearly seventyfive percent were identified by an eyewitness. 241 Astonishingly, in

234. See infra Part IV.B.
235. See infra Part IV.B.1. The scientific literature referenced in Henderson is sufficient
for revising the due process constraint and therefore the Court does not need to conduct
any additional research. Nearly all of the scientific literature referenced in this Note was
discussed by Henderson.
236. See infra Part IV.B.2.
237. New Jersey v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 896–911 (N.J. 2011).
238. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199–200 (1972).
239. Henderson, 27 A.3d at 885–86.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 886; see also GARRETT, supra note 23, at 48 (noting that 190 of 250 exonerees
were misidentified by a witness). Defendants were either directly identified as being the
assailant, or were said to have been in the vicinity when the crime occurred. Id. at 51. The
majority of the exonerees in this particular study were convicted of rape. Id.
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some instances, several witnesses independently misidentified these
defendants. 242
The Henderson court recognized that eyewitness memory is not
like a videotape that can be “replay[ed]” inside the witness’s head, but
rather is “a constructive, dynamic, and selective process.” 243 The witness’s memory is affected by variables that may decrease the reliability
of an identification. 244 The variables, which may affect the witness’s
memory and therefore the reliability of her identification, are divided
into two subcategories: system variables and estimator variables. 245
System variables, which are within the control of law enforcement, include whether the identification procedure was administered
in a blind fashion, the content and existence of pre-identification instructions, the construction of the lineup, whether the witness was
given any confirmatory feedback, whether the eyewitness had multiple
opportunities to view the defendant during the course of the investigation, whether the individuals comprising the lineup were viewed
sequentially or simultaneously, whether the police used composite
sketches to produce an image of the suspect, and whether the police
facilitated a one-man showup. 246 Take, for example, whether police
conducted a pretrial lineup procedure in a blind fashion, that is,
whether the officer conducting the pretrial lineup knew which individual in the lineup was the primary suspect. “[B]y consciously or unconsciously communicating to [a] witness[] which lineup member is
the suspect,” an officer may influence the witness’s response. 247 “Even
seemingly innocuous words and subtle cues—-pauses, gestures, hesita-

242. GARRETT, supra note 23, at 50. This was the case in nearly forty percent of the exonerees studied. Id.; see also Bloodsworth v. State, 76 Md. App. 23, 55, 543 A.2d 382, 398
(1988) (explaining that the defendant was identified by five eyewitnesses); Christine E.
White, Comment, Clearly Erroneous: The Court of Appeals of Maryland’s Misguided Shift to a
Higher Standard for Post-Conviction Relief, 71 MD. L. REV. 886, 886–87 (2012) (noting that
Bloodsworth was exonerated on the basis of DNA testing).
243. Henderson, 27 A.3d at 895; see also GARRETT, supra note 23, at 48 (“[E]yewitness
memory is not just fallible; more important, it is malleable.”).
244. Henderson, 27 A.3d at 895.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 896–900.

The list of system variables provided by the court is non-

exhaustive. Id. at 920.
247. Sarah M. Greathouse & Margaret Bull Kovera, Instruction Bias and Lineup Presentation Moderate the Effects of Administrator Knowledge on Eyewitness Identification, 33 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 70, 71 (2009).
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tions, or smiles—-can influence a witness’ behavior.” 248 What is further alarming is that the witness may not even be aware that such suggestion is occurring. 249
Estimator variables, which are outside the control of law enforcement, include the witness’s level of stress, whether the criminal
used a weapon, whether the witness is a different race than the perpetrator, and the decay of the witness’s memory over time. 250 As an illustration, take the instance of a victim being robbed at gunpoint. The
presence of a gun may draw the witness’s attention away from the assailant’s face and onto the gun itself. 251 Thus, the presence of a visible
weapon may decrease the witness’s ability to make a reliable identification or provide an accurate description of the assailant. 252
The way witnesses evaluate individuals when making an identification may also contribute to the likelihood of misidentification. 253 In
a pretrial lineup, for instance, an eyewitness may use a “relativejudgment process” when selecting an individual as the perpetrator. 254
That is, the witness will “choose[] the lineup member who most resembles the culprit relative to the other members of the lineup.” 255 As a result of making a relative judgment, the witness may make a positive
identification, even if the actual perpetrator is absent from the
lineup. 256
Although the reliability of eyewitness identifications has been
called into question, it is reasonable to ask why misidentifications are

248. Henderson, 27 A.3d at 896.
249. Id. at 896–97.
250. Id. at 904–07.
251. Id. at 904–05.
252. Id. at 905.
253. See, e.g., Gary L. Wells, What Do We Know About Eyewitness Identification?, 48 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 553, 560–61 (1993) [hereinafter Wells, Eyewitness Identification] (referencing studies that suggest that human cognitive processes operate differently when identifying individuals from photographs or lineups).
254. Id. at 560.
255. Id.
256. Id. In a study conducted by Professor Wells, 200 individuals viewed a staged crime.
Id. at 561. One half of the participants were shown a lineup containing the criminal; the
second half were shown a lineup containing all innocent fillers. Id. Even though both
groups were told that the criminal might not be present in the lineup, nearly seventy percent of the individuals in the second group identified an innocent filler as the criminal.
Id.
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a problem given that a false identification itself does not necessarily
result in conviction. 257 False identifications alone do not raise a concern about miscarriages of justice, “but rather [it is] the certainty with
which such false identifications are sometimes made.” 258 The witness’s level of certainty raises a concern because, when considering
whether or not to believe a witness, jurors rely heavily on the level of
confidence with which the witness gives her testimony. 259 Furthermore, “there is considerable evidence that false identifications are often asserted with as much confidence as are accurate identifications,” 260 and certainty, like memory, is malleable. 261
The danger of miscarriage of justice resulting from a misidentification is further compounded by the fact that jurors often hold beliefs about memory that are, in fact, contrary to scientific literature. 262
For example, many might believe that a victim to an armed robbery
would never forget what the assailant, who held the gun to her head,
looked like. 263 As noted above, however, reliability is affected adversely by both stress and the presence of a visible weapon. 264
Under the current due process test, lower federal and state
courts are to evaluate reliability by looking to five factors: (1) the opportunity to view the criminal, (2) the witness’s level of attention, (3)
the accuracy of the description given by the witness, (4) the witness’s
level of certainty, and (5) the lapse of time between the crime and the
identification. 265 This test, however, “is deeply flawed . . . [for] it also
includes some factors that do not actually” measure reliability. 266 For
instance,
three of those factors—the opportunity to view the crime,
the witness’ degree of attention, and the level of certainty at

257. See Gary L. Wells, The Psychology of Lineup Identifications, 14 J. APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 89, 90 (1984) [hereinafter Wells, Lineup Identifications] (“It is important . . . to
keep in mind that a false identification does not automatically convict anyone.”).
258. Wells, Eyewitness Identification, supra note 253, at 564 (citation omitted).
259. Wells, Lineup Identifications, supra note 257, at 91.
260. Id.
261. Wells, Eyewitness Identification, supra note 253, at 565.
262. Id.
263. See id. (noting the common belief that those who experience traumatic situations
“never forget a face” because of their focus on the incident).
264. See supra text accompanying notes 250–252.
265. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199–200 (1972).
266. GARRETT, supra note 23, at 63.
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the time of the identification—rely on self-reporting by eyewitnesses; and research has shown that those reports can be
skewed by the suggestive procedures themselves and thus
may not be reliable. 267
Recognizing the inadequacy of the current due process framework as a measure of reliability, the Henderson court proposed a new
framework that would examine system and estimator variables when
gauging reliability. 268 Rather than assess reliability on the basis of the
five Biggers factors, the Henderson court explained that all relevant system and estimator variables should be considered when there is evidence of suggestion. 269
The reason why the Supreme Court should have abandoned the
current measures of reliability in favor of the system and estimator
variables outlined by the Henderson court is simple. Due process protections arose out of the Court’s concern with ensuring reliability, 270
and the current Biggers factors inadequately ensure that an eyewitness’s identification testimony is reliable. 271 Furthermore, evaluating
the reliability of a potential eyewitness on the basis of the system and
estimator variables outlined by the Henderson court reflects recent developments in social science and is a more reliable method by which
to guarantee reliability. 272 In the face of nearly thirty years of scientific literature, the Court should have redeveloped its due process
framework by using factors that better gauge reliability and abandoned the outmoded measures of reliability it now uses.
2. To Adequately Ensure That Eyewitness Identifications Are
Reliable, the Perry Court Should Have Included All Suggestive
Circumstances Within the Scope of Due Process
In addition to overhauling the measures of reliability, the Court
should have included all suggestive circumstances within the scope of

267. State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 918 (2011).
268. Id. at 919.
269. Id. For a defendant to be entitled to a pretrial determination of an identification’s
reliability, however, the evidence of suggestion must usually be tied to a system variable.
Id. at 920.
270. See supra Part IV.A.
271. Henderson, 27 A.3d at 918.
272. See id. at 922 (advocating that courts consider variables relating to eyewitness identifications that are generally accepted by the scientific community, and asserting that the
new framework will better protect the right to a fair trial).
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the due process constraint. In this regard, the Henderson court did
not go far enough. 273 All suggestive circumstances, whether they are
related to a system or estimator variable, have the potential to adversely affect the reliability of an eyewitness identification. 274 Put differently, the effects of suggestion are the same irrespective of whom or what
caused the suggestion. 275 The Perry Court and the Henderson court,
however, restricted the potential application of the due process constraint to instances where the police caused the suggestion. 276 Therefore, under either approach, a court will never need to consider
whether the effects of suggestive circumstances, which are tied solely
to estimator variables, warrant an application of the due process protections.
To restrict the scope of the due process constraint in this manner
is to rely heavily upon the ability of the jury to weigh the reliability of
an eyewitness’s testimony. 277 Jurors, however, are largely unaware of
how estimator variables actually affect the reliability of an eyewitness’s
testimony. 278 What is perhaps worse is that they often hold views that
are contrary to scientific findings. 279 Jurors, simply put, place too
much faith in eyewitness testimony, especially when that eyewitness is
confident in her assertions. 280
273. The Henderson approach requires suggestiveness related to police conduct to trigger the due process constraint. See id. at 920 (allowing for a pretrial hearing when a system
variable is implicated). That is, if a suggestive circumstance is only suggestive as a result of
estimator variables, which are out of law enforcement’s control, the court will not apply
due process. Id.
274. Id. at 922.
275. Id.
276. Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 730 (2012); State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d
872, 920 (2011). The Perry Court additionally seemed to suggest that the police conduct
must be intentionally suggestive. See Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 734 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(noting that the “police-arranged” requirement “connote[s] a degree of intentional orchestration or manipulation”).
277. See Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 728 (majority opinion) (explaining that the Court’s approach relies heavily upon the role of jurors to weigh eyewitness testimony); Henderson, 27
A.3d at 923 (finding that jury instructions are sufficient in instances where the suggestion
is tied solely to estimator variables).
278. See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 910 (internal quotation marks omitted) (finding “that
laypersons are largely unfamiliar with scientific findings).
279. Id.
280. See supra notes 259–261 and accompanying text; Wells, Lineup Identifications, supra
note 257, at 91 (noting that an eyewitness’s confidence is the “primary predictor” of
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The Perry Court cited to “procedural safeguards,” such as the
Sixth Amendment right to confront adverse witnesses, as a way to ensure that jurors properly weigh the reliability of eyewitness testimony. 281 Such an argument, however, cannot stand; of the nearly two
hundred exonerees misidentified by a witness, “defense lawyers typically did cross-examine eyewitnesses, often aggressively.” 282 In defense
of its approach, the Henderson court suggested that revised jury instructions are sufficient to instruct jurors on how to properly weigh
eyewitness testimony when that testimony has been subject to suggestion tied only to an estimator variable. 283 Much like the Supreme
Court’s reliance on procedural safeguards, 284 any reliance on jury instructions, no matter how informative, is misguided. 285 Jurors place
too much faith in the confident eyewitness; are generally unaware of
how suggestion affects reliability; and have perceptions that are largely unaffected by either procedural safeguards, such as crossexaminations or jury instructions. 286 Therefore, allowing suggestive
eyewitness identification to be introduced at trial because police arrangement is nonexistent is contrary to the very foundation of due
process. 287
V. CONCLUSION
In Perry v. New Hampshire, the Court concluded that courts are
not required, under the Due Process Clause, to conduct pretrial in-

whether jurors will believe her); Wells, Eyewitness Identification, supra note 253, at 564
(same).
281. Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 728.
282. GARRETT, supra note 23, at 48, 54.
283. See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 923, 925–26 (finding that jury instructions, not pretrial
hearings, were appropriate when estimator variables were involved, and asking that the
drafters of revised jury instructions consider both system and estimator variables).
284. See supra note 294 and accompanying text.
285. See Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 356 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“To
expect a jury to engage in the collective mental gymnastic of segregating and ignoring
such [identification] testimony upon instruction is utterly unrealistic.”); BRIAN L. CUTLER
& STEVEN D. PENROD, MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION: THE EYEWITNESS, PSYCHOLOGY, AND THE
LAW 263–64 (1995) (noting that there is little support for the contention that a judge’s
instructions concerning the reliability of an eyewitness’s testimony will aid jurors in weighing such evidence, and that such instructions do not effectively prevent misidentification).
286. See supra notes 278–280, 282, 285 and accompanying text.
287. See supra Part IV.A.
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quiries into the reliability of eyewitness identifications made under
suggestive circumstances not arranged by law enforcement. 288 The
Court’s determination that deterrence was a fundamental aim of the
due process constraint was a consequence of the Court’s misguided
focus on the presence of suggestive, police-arranged procedures in its
eyewitness identification jurisprudence. 289 The majority failed to recognize that the constraint arose out of the Court’s concern with the
reliability of eyewitness identifications and that police arrangement of
the identification procedure—present in its eyewitness identification
jurisprudence as a result of practical realities—was only discussed insofar as it affected reliability. 290 Aside from avoiding this error in interpretation, the Court should have revised the due process framework to better measure reliability and recognized that the due process
constraint ought to apply in all suggestive circumstances. 291

288. Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 730 (2011).
289. See supra Part IV.A.
290. See supra Part IV.A.
291. See supra Part IV.B.

